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I. INTRODUCTION

It is now widely accepted that global climate change will have
dramatic impacts for the Arctic. The rapid warming of the Arctic
climate was the first and most prominent of the ten key findings of
the 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA)1. In September
2007, the Arctic ice cap was 23% below the last record, set in
2005.2 This 2007 record exceeded the computer model predictions
used to prepare the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007.3 Perhaps even
more important than ice-coverage as such, is the increasing percentage of first-year sea ice. Many scientists fear that the “Arctic
meltdown” has become irreversible, even though the 2007 record
remained intact in 2008.
Of particular importance to this paper are ACIA’s key findings
number four, “[a]nimal species’ diversity, ranges, and distribution
will change” and number six, “[r]educed sea ice is very likely to increase marine transport and access to resources.”4 While the former predicts changes in the composition of the Arctic marine ecosystem in quantitative, qualitative, spatial, and temporal terms,
the latter predicts increased pressure on this ecosystem due to
more intensive exercise of existing maritime uses as well as new
1. SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A WARMING ARCTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT
ASSESSMENT 10 (2004).
2. Press Release, Nat’l Snow & Ice Data Ctr., Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous
Record Lows (Oct. 1, 2007), http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/
20071001_pressrelease.html.
3. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Atmosphere Res., Arctic Ice Retreating More Quickly
than Computer Models Project (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.ucar.edu/news/releases/
2007/seaice.html.
4. HASSOL, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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uses. Examples of these are maritime navigation (for the transport
of persons and cargo, including for tourism and military purposes),
exploration and exploitation of living (e.g., fishing) and non-living
(e.g., oil and gas) marine resources, construction of artificial installations, laying of cables and pipelines, overflight and marine scientific research (including bio-prospecting).
In view of these current and predicted threats to the Arctic marine ecosystem, the question logically arises if existing Arctic governance and regulatory regimes are adequately responding to
these threats.5 The Arctic is covered by a variety of governance and
regulatory regimes relating to the protection and preservation of
the marine environment and the conservation and sustainable use
of marine biodiversity. However, some commentators perceive the
planting of the flag of the Russian Federation on the deep-sea bed
of the North Pole in August 2007 as the start of the last “scramble
for territory and resources”6 in human history, likely even to lead
to armed conflicts. One of the key messages of the May 2008 Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states7 is that this
perception is fundamentally flawed.
The objective of this paper is to examine (in a historical perspective) the roles of the European Union (EU) and Canada in governance and regulation of human activities in the Arctic Ocean.
Section two describes the existing “tangled” nature of governance
in the Arctic with a focus on law of the sea, approaches and challenges in the region, as well as on EU and Canadian participation
in the activities of the Arctic Council. The “shifting seascape” in
governance is next highlighted in section three with a review of
increasing calls for change from scholars and other groups, recent
governance initiatives from the United States and Arctic Ocean
coastal states, and evolving EU and Canadian perspectives towards ocean governance. The paper concludes with section four,
which surveys possible future directions for strengthening ocean
5. For a recent discussion on Arctic fisheries, see ERIK J. MOLENAAR & ROBERT
CORELL, BACKGROUND PAPER: ARCTIC FISHERIES (2009), available at http://www.arctictransform.org/download/FishBP.pdf. For a recent discussion on Arctic shipping, see Erik J.
Molenaar, Arctic Marine Shipping: Overview of the International Legal Framework, Gaps
and Options, 18 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 289 (2009). For a cross-sectional discussion, see TIMO KOIVUROVA & ERIK J. MOLENAAR, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF THE MARINE ARCTIC: OVERVIEW AND GAP ANALYSIS (2009), available at
http://www.panda.org/arctic.
6. Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of
Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 63.
7. Arctic Ocean Conference, Ilulissat Declaration (May 28, 2008), available at
http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf.
[hereinafter
Ilulissat
Declaration]. The five are: Canada, Denmark (on behalf of Greenland), Norway, the Russian
Federation and the United States.
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governance in the Arctic, with the spectrum of options including,
among others, expanding the spatial scopes of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), established by the NEAFC
Convention8, and the OSPAR Commission, established by the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlantic (OSPAR) Convention,9 and reform by means of an
Implementing Agreement under the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (LOS)10.
II. TANGLED GOVERNANCE
A. The Law of the Sea and the Arctic Ocean
1. Introduction
The cornerstones of the current international law of the sea are
the LOS Convention and its two Implementing Agreements, the
Part XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement,11 and the Fish Stocks
Agreement.12 The current international law of the sea applies to
the marine environment of the entire globe; including, therefore,
the entire marine environment of the Arctic Ocean,
however defined.
The LOS Convention’s overarching objective is to establish a
universally accepted, just, and equitable legal order, or “Constitution,” for the oceans that lessens the risk of international conflict
and enhances stability and peace in the international community.
The LOS Convention currently has 160 parties, the Part XI DeepSea Mining Agreement has 138 parties, and the Fish Stocks
Agreement has 77 parties. All Arctic states are parties to these
three treaties, except for the United States, which is not a party to
either the LOS Convention or the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining
Agreement.13 The European Community (EC) is party to all three
8. Convention on Future Multilateral Co-Operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries,
Nov. 18, 1980, 1285 U.N.T.S. 129 [hereinafter NEAFC].
9. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992 [hereinafter OSPAR Convention], available at http://www.ospar.org/
html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf (in force Mar.
25, 1998); id., Annex V (in force Aug. 30, 2000); id. art. 27(2).
10. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
11. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, July 28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309.
12. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 34
I.L.M. 1542.
13. See United Nations, Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the
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treaties. This is important in view of the fact that Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are Member States of the European Union14 and
Iceland and Norway are parties to the European Economic Area
(EEA) Agreement.15
The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty, sovereign
rights, freedoms, rights, jurisdiction, and obligations of states
within several maritime zones. The most important of these, for
the Arctic, are internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic
zone (EEZ), continental shelf, high seas, and the “Area.”16 Internal
waters lie landward of the baselines. The maximum breadth of the
territorial sea is twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1,852 meters) measured from the baselines. Twenty-four nautical miles is
the maximum breadth for the contiguous zone as is 200 nautical
miles for the EEZ. However, in many geographical settings these
maximum breadths cannot be reached due to the proximity of the
baselines of opposite states. In such circumstances, maritime
boundaries have to be agreed on by the opposite states. Several of
these maritime boundaries have already been established in the
Arctic Ocean and negotiations on several others are still ongoing.
The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal
state over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
sea, the airspace above, and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty entails exclusive access and control of living and non-living resources
and all-encompassing jurisdiction over all human activities, unless
states have in one way or another consented to restrictions thereon. The LOS Convention also recognizes specific economic and resource-related sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state
with respect to its EEZ and, where relevant, outer continental
shelf. Nevertheless, other states have navigational rights or freedoms within the maritime zones of coastal states and with respect
to their EEZ, and, where relevant, outer continental shelf, also the
freedoms of overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines
and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to
these freedoms . . . .”17
Article 76 of the LOS Convention also recognizes that in certain circumstances the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautiRelated Agreements, as at 5 February 2009, http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/
status2008.pdf (last visited July 19, 2009).
14. Even though EU membership of Denmark does not encompass Greenland.
15. Agreement on the European Economic Area, March 17, 1993, O.J. No. L 1,
3.1.1994. Note that the EEA Agreement does not apply to Svalbard.
16. The LOS Convention defines “[a]rea” as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” LOS Convention, supra note 10,
art. 1(1)(1).
17. LOS Convention, supra note 10, art. 58(1).
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cal miles from the baselines. This is the so-called “outer continental shelf.” Coastal states that take the view that they have an outer continental shelf must submit information on their outer limits
on the basis of the criteria in Article 76 to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).18 “The limits of the [outer
continental] shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of
these recommendations [of the CLCS] shall be final and binding.”19
So far, only the Russian Federation and Norway have made submissions to the CLCS in relation to their outer continental shelves
that lie within the Arctic Ocean. The CLCS has, up until now, only
made an interim recommendation in relation to the submission of
the Russian Federation.20 The CLCS essentially recommended that
the Russian Federation make a revised submission as regards the
central Arctic Ocean basin.21 The Russian Federation is expected
to do this in 2010. Canada, Denmark (in relation to Greenland),
and the United States are all engaged in activities to enable them
to make submissions to the CLCS, despite the fact that the United
States is not yet party to the LOS Convention.22 Canada has to
make its submission by December 2013 and Denmark by December 2014.23 It should be noted that it is likely that there will be two
pockets of the Area in the central Arctic Ocean and one large high
seas pocket.
In the high seas, all states have the freedoms already mentioned above as well as the freedom to construct artificial islands
and other installations, the freedom to fish, and the freedom to
conduct scientific research. These freedoms are all subject to conditions and obligations.24 The Area and its resources are the “common heritage of mankind” and the International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) is charged with organizing and controlling all activities of
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.25
2. Rights, Interests, and Obligations of the EU and Its
Member States
18. Id. art. 76.
19. Id. art. 76(8).
20. The Secretary-General, Addendum to Report of the Secretary-General on the
Oceans of the Law and the Sea, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/57/Add.1
(Oct. 8, 2002), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/629/28/
PDF/N0262928.pdf?OpenElement.
21. Id. ¶ 41.
22. See National Security Presidential Directive No. 66 & Homeland Security
Presidential Directive No. 25: Artic Region Policy at sec. D(4)(a) (Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter
Presidential Policy Directive], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
23. See LOS Convention, supra note 10, annex II, art. 4.
24. Id. art. 87(1).
25. Id. arts. 1(1)(3), 136, 156, 157(1).
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The competence of the EU and its Member States regarding
the Arctic Ocean is determined by general international law as
well as by European Community (EC) law. It goes without saying
that EU Member States cannot confer more extensive competence
to the EU than they themselves possess in accordance with international law.
The fact that none of the current EU Member States are coastal states with respect to the Arctic Ocean (not even via the EEA
Agreement or via Greenland, which chose in the mid-1980s to
withdraw from the then EEC, and hence is not part of the EC or
EU) is clearly a major feature and constraint of EU policy regarding the Arctic Ocean. While neither the EU nor its Member States
can act as coastal states with respect to the Arctic Ocean, they can
still act in a wide range of other capacities. For instance, they may
act as flag states, port states, market states, or with respect to
their natural and legal persons. In a flag state capacity, the EU
and its Member States are able to exercise their rights and discharge their obligations with respect to the Arctic Ocean, most
notably the freedoms of the high seas in the high seas pockets in
the Arctic Ocean (e.g., marine scientific research and the laying of
cables and pipelines), the navigational rights and freedoms in the
maritime zones of Arctic Ocean coastal states, and the obligations
relating to marine living resources and the marine environment
connected to these rights and freedoms.
In addition to these rights and obligations, the EU and its
Member States may also have various user and non-user interests
in the Arctic Ocean. The main user interests would be related to
the exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon resources.
As traditional energy resources will be of paramount importance to
all EU Member States for at least the next few decades, access to
the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be an important security issue. The main non-user interests include the protection and
preservation of the marine environment and safeguarding marine
biodiversity. The EU and its Member States could argue that they
want to become involved in the governance and regulation of the
marine Arctic to safeguard these non-user interests, in their own
right, or, together with non-Arctic states, on behalf of the international community. Such participation may for instance be aimed at
monitoring and ensuring that obligations with respect to the Arctic
marine area are complied with.
In case the EU would act, it would also need to have shared or
exclusive competence. The distribution of competence between the
EU and its Member States is determined by the EC Treaty, the EU
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Treaty,26 and other treaties concluded within the framework of the
EC and the EU. The scope and extent of EC and EU competence is
governed by the principle of conferral and the use of conferred (exclusive) competence is, inter alia, governed by the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.27 The distribution of competence
is a dynamic matter in which the judgments of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) play a key role. While adjustments of competence
can be a consequence of increasing importance of EC legislation
and acts by the EC Commission, it can also be negotiated between
EU Member States. The latter adjustments can lead to more competence being conferred to the EC and EU but also to competence
being delegated back to EU Member States.
The spheres in which the EC has competence can be gleaned
from Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which lists the activities the EC
shall undertake for the purposes set out in Article 2. While Article
3 sets out the policy areas which the EU may address, it does not
in itself provide a legal basis for specific legislative acts. The specific measures available to the EC are set out in other parts of the
EC Treaty. Included in this list are fishing, shipping (transport),
and environmental protection.28 In addition, Article 6 of the EC
Treaty stipulates, “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must
be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular
with a view to promoting sustainable development.”29
EU Member States are generally free to pursue their own policies alongside the EU, unless the EU’s or EC’s competence is exclusive or a subject matter in shared competence is dealt with exhaustively by the EU, leaving the Member States no room for additional measures. The ECJ already ruled in 1981 that the EC has
exclusive competence in fisheries conservation and management.30
This exclusiveness relates to community waters and probably also
seaward thereof, but is also subject to some exceptions, for instance in relation to enforcement.31 The consequential external
26. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 13
[hereinafter EU Treaty].
27. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
art. 5, 2006 O.J. (C 321) E1 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; EU Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 4-5.
28. The sectors and spheres listed in Article 3 of the EC Treaty are addressed in more
detail in other provisions in the EC Treaty. As regards fisheries, see EC Treaty, supra note
27, arts. 32-38; as regards shipping, see id. arts. 70-80; as regards environmental protection,
see id. arts. 6, 174-176.
29. Id. art. 6.
30. Comm’n of the Eur. Community. v. U.K., 1981 E.C.R. 1045.
31. See Eur. Community, Declaration Upon Signature of the Fish Stocks Agreement
(June 27, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
fish_stocks_agreement_declarations.htm#EC; Eur. Community, Declaration Upon
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competence of the EC in the sphere of fisheries implies that the EC
represents EU Member States, for instance in negotiations with
non-EU Member States and in regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). Subject to some exceptions, EU Member
States cannot become members of RFMOs alongside the EC. One
of these exceptions relates to “overseas countries and territories”
and enables, inter alia, Denmark to become a member of RFMOs
alongside the EC on behalf of the Faroe Island, Greenland, or both.
Competence with regards to shipping and environmental protection is shared between the EU and its Member States. This
mixed competence also means that the EC cannot represent EU
Member States in international fora, like the International Maritime Organization (IMO). So far, the EC has, as an intergovernmental organization, concluded an agreement on cooperation with
the IMO.32 In areas of shared competence, agreements are often
signed by the EC as well as by EU Member States (so-called
“mixed agreements”).33 This requires close cooperation
between them.
Competence over offshore hydrocarbon activities is a much less
straightforward matter. While the list in Article 3 of the EC Treaty
does not include the specific term “offshore hydrocarbon activities,”
it could be argued it falls within the scope of the broader term or
sphere of “energy” referred to in Article 3(1)(u). As Article 3 does
not give the EC a general legal basis for legislation in the field of
energy,34 the EC may be able to adopt enactments that rely on one
or more of the other bases in Article 3 or pursue one or more of the
objectives set out in Article 2 that in one way or another impact
offshore hydrocarbon activities undertaken within the maritime
zones of EU Member States or seaward thereof by EU Member
States or their natural or legal persons. Environmental protection
would be an example. It is clear that, at the most, competence
would be shared and not exclusive.
3. Canada and the Law of the Sea in the Arctic
Canada might be described as a pioneer in developing state
Ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement (Dec. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/fish_stocks_agreement_declarations.ht
m#EC
32. Int’l Mar. Org. [IMO], Mitropoulos and EC Commissioner Barrot in Agreement
Across Wide-Ranging Agenda, Feb. 11, 2005, available at http://www.imo.org/about/
mainframe.asp?topic _id=1018&doc_id=4701.
33. It is also possible that the agreement is signed only by the EC or only by the EU
Member States.
34. EC measures and legislation have mostly been based on the common market.
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practice and law of the sea in relation to Arctic marine shipping.
Following the 1969 trial transit of the ice-adapted oil tanker, the
S.S. Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage,35 Canada unilaterally responded to the threat of possible future foreign tanker
transits by enacting the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.36
The Act, which is still in force today, established a 100 nautical
mile pollution prevention zone in Arctic waters and prohibited all
deposits of waste by any person or ship except as provided in regulations.37 The Act also authorized the Governor in Council (federal
cabinet) to subdivide Arctic waters into shipping safety control
zones and to pass regulations for the control of shipping within the
zones, including construction, equipment, and crewing standards.38
Subsequent legal measures followed. Through a Shipping Safety Control Zones Order,39 Canada divided its Arctic waters into sixteen shipping safety control zones. Through Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations,40 Canada established a complex array
of shipping control measures including a prohibition on the discharge of oil or oily mixtures, with narrow exceptions such as engine exhaust and for the purpose of saving the loss of a ship.41
To help the codification of the law of the sea “catch up” with the
need to protect vulnerable Arctic waters from shipping pollution,
Canada also worked multilaterally within the negotiations for the
LOS Convention. Working together with the Soviet Union and the
United States, Canada was successful in obtaining the insertion of
Article 234 into the Convention, which recognizes the special legislative and enforcement powers of coastal states to control marine
pollution from vessels in ice-covered waters within the limits of the
EEZ.42
The transit of the United States Coast Guard vessel, Polar Sea,
through the Northwest Passage in August 1985, without officially
seeking permission from Canada, raised further law of the sea tensions, to which Canada responded.43 On September 10, 1985, Ex35. For a detailed discussion, see John Kirton & Don Munton, The Manhattan
Voyages and Their Aftermath, in P OLITICS OF THE N ORTHWEST P ASSAGE 67-97 (F.
Griffiths
ed., 1987).
36. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12 (1970) (Can.).
37. Id. § 4(1).
38. Id. §§ 11(1), 12.
39. Shipping Safety Control Zones Order, C.R.C. c. 356 (Can.).
40. Arctic Shipping Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C. c. 353 (Can.).
41. Id. § 29(c).
42. 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY
392-98 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1991).
43. For a further review of the incident and Canadian responses, see Suzanne
Lalonde, Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of Readiness 38
REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 49, 65-69 (2004).
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ternal Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, formalized Canada’s sovereignty claim over Arctic waters by announcing the drawing of straight
baselines (effective January 1, 1986) around the Canadian Arctic
Archipelago.44 He also declared a governmental intention to construct a Polar Class 8 icebreaker to ensure a greater Canadian
presence in the North,45 but that icebreaker was never built.
The international legal validity of enclosing the Canadian Arctic Archipelago with straight baselines remains contentious. The
United States, the EC, and other countries lodged formal protests
against Canada’s action.46 Whether Canada can justify its claim of
internal waters status for the enclosed waters based upon their
being historic waters is in doubt.47 Whether Canada’s straight
baseline system meets law of the sea customary or convention requirements has been subject to debate.48
A further law of the sea issue hovering over Canada’s Arctic
waters is whether the Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation. The United States and Canada have a
long-standing dispute on that front, with the United States considering the Northwest Passage a strait subject to the LOS Convention’s transit passage regime,49 where coastal state controls would
be very limited.50 Since the LOS Convention does not define what
is meant by “used for international navigation,” there is room for
argument. Various factors might be used to determine the level of
required use, including, among others, the number of ships transiting the strait, the shipping tonnage, and the number of flag states
involved.51 Whether actual or potential use is necessary for a strait
to qualify as “used for international navigation” may be a further
point of contention.52
In 1988, Canada and the United States reached a “stalemate”

44. Right Honourable Joe Clark, Can. Sec’y of State for External Affairs, Statement in
the House of Commons on Canadian Sovereignty, 85/49 (Sept. 10, 1985).
45. Id.
46. See ERIK FRANCKX, MARITIME CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC: CANADIAN AND RUSSIAN
PERSPECTIVES 133 (1993).
47. See DONAT PHARAND, CANADA’S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
121-25 (1988).
48. See id. at 131-84; FRANCKX, supra note 46, at 104-07.
49. BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, LIMITS IN THE SEAS:
UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 73 (1992).
50. Pursuant to Article 42 of the LOS Convention, States bordering straits may only
adopt marine safety and pollution laws giving effect to international regulations, and
pursuant to Article 41, bordering States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes where necessary to promote the safe passage of ships, but only after seeking and
receiving IMO approval.
51. See Donat Pharand, The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit,
38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 3, 34-35 (2007).
52. Id. at 35-36.
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agreement on Arctic cooperation.53 They agreed to set aside their
jurisdictional dispute over the legal status of the Northwest Passage. The United States agreed that its icebreakers would be subject to Canadian consent for transits within waters claimed by
Canada to be internal. The countries also agreed to share research
information regarding the marine environment gained through
icebreaker navigation.
Many questions still surround Article 234 of the LOS Convention. What is the precise meaning of waters covered by ice for most
of the year? What is the significance of giving special coastal state
powers only in the EEZ? Some writers have suggested the EEZ
limitation implies that coastal states are granted no greater powers over foreign ships than in the territorial sea,54 while another
interpretation supports a bestowing of much broader powers, including the right to unilaterally adopt special design, construction,
crewing, and equipment requirements.55 Such interpretive questions may also relate to straits used for international navigation
since Article 233 of the Convention, which seeks to safeguard the
legal regime of straits, does not exempt straits from the application
of Article 234.56
Canada has two ocean boundary disputes in the Arctic in addition to a disagreement with Denmark/Greenland over the ownership of Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to
dispute the location of the ocean boundary in the Beaufort Sea,
with some 6250 square nautical miles of area having good potential for hydrocarbon deposits at stake.57 Canada maintains that the
141st west meridian should be the boundary line, in light of 1825
and 1867 treaties, while the United States has argued for a strict
equidistance line.58 Canada and Denmark/Greenland, while delimitating most of the continental shelf through a 1973 agreement,
have yet to complete the northern portion of the boundary in the
Lincoln Sea.59 Canada and Denmark/Greenland also dispute own53. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada on Artic Cooperation and Accompanying Notes, 28 I.L.M. 141 (1989)
[hereinafter Agreement on Arctic Cooperation].
54. See D.M. McRae & D.J. Goundrey, Environmental Jurisdiction in Arctic Waters:
The Extent of Article 234, 16 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 197, 221 (1982).
55. Pharand, supra note 51, at 47-48.
56. See Cynthia Lamson & David VanderZwaag, Arctic Waters: Needs and Options for
Canadian-American Cooperation, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 49, 81 (1987).
57. DAVID VANDERZWAAG ET AL., GOVERNANCE OF ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING at
App. C (2008).
58. Karen L. Lawson, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The
United States-Canada Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 221, 241-43 (1982).
59. Dawn Russell, International Ocean Boundary Issues and Management
Arrangements, in CANADIAN OCEAN LAW AND POLICY 490 (David VanderZwaag ed., 1992).
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ership of the uninhabited Hans Island, located in Nares Strait.60
The island represents a tiny “gap” in the continental shelf delimitation agreed to in 1973.61
Through the Oceans Act, Canada has brought its offshore jurisdictional zones into line with the LOS Convention. Canada has
formally established a twelve nautical mile territorial sea,62 a
twenty-four nautical mile contiguous zone,63 a 200 nautical mile
EEZ64 and a continental shelf of at least 200 nautical miles measured from the territorial sea baselines or to the outer edge of the
continental margin.65 For Arctic waters, of course, those maritime
zones extend outward from the straight baseline system established in 1986 around the Arctic islands.
B. The Arctic Council and the Marine Environment
1. Introduction
During the Cold War, Arctic-wide cooperation was not possible,
except in very limited policy areas, such as the conclusion of the
1973 Polar Bear Treaty66 between the five Arctic range states. This
was due to the fact that the two superpowers and their allies confronted each other in the Arctic, which was estimated by many as
one of the major military strategic hot spots during the Cold War.
After all, NATO was a neighbor to the Soviet Union via Norway,
and the United States and the Soviet Union shared a border in the
Bering and Chukchi Seas. It was the perestroika and glasnost that
opened up opportunities for pan-Arctic cooperation. SecretaryGeneral Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk in 1987 proposed panArctic cooperation in a number of fields, one of these being the protection of the Arctic environment. Inspired by Gorbachev’s speech
outlining various areas for Arctic cooperation, Finland took the initiative in 1989 for pan-Arctic co-operation in one of these policy
areas, that of environmental protection; in 1991 the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was adopted by the eight
Arctic states by means of a declaration.67
60. Id.
61. Oceans Act, S.C., 1996, c. 31 (Can.).
62. Id. § 4.
63. Id. § 10.
64. Id. § 13.
65. Id. § 17.
66. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ., Nov.
15, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 13 (1973), available at http://pbsg.npolar.no.
67. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy § 2.1(v), U.S.-Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.Russ.-Swed., June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624 (1991).
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The AEPS achieved one important thing. Even though the cooperation itself was a fairly low-committal exercise with weak institutional structure, it enabled us to start thinking of societal and
environmental problems for the first time from the Arctic perspective (rather than from the perspective of individual country’s
northern or Arctic region) and tackle them with policy measures.
The AEPS is also vastly important for understanding the current functioning of the Arctic Council,68 and the proposals to renew
it, since, even though the Arctic cooperation ostensibly was transformed from the AEPS to the Arctic Council during the transitional period of 1996-1998, the basic elements of the cooperation have
been in place from 1991, with only slight changes taking place.
Even though there is a new mandate on sustainable development in the Council, the AEPS had a task force on sustainable development and utilization in the Arctic, which had more ambitious
goals than the present Sustainable Development Working Group
(SDWG).69 There are still the same participants in the cooperation,
although the Declaration establishing the Council strengthened
the status of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations as permanent participants with power to influence decision-making (they
were observers in the AEPS). The same institutional structure has
been retained, ministerial meetings convened every two years and
senior arctic officials (SAOs) managing the day-to-day activities of
the Council. The four environmental protection working groups of
the AEPS, namely Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna
(CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME),
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), were
integrated into the structure of the Council. In addition, two new
working groups were established, the SDWG and the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP).
To date, there is no permanent secretariat in the Council, as
was the case in the AEPS, although the three Scandinavian states
have agreed to maintain the secretariat in Tromsø till 2012.70 As
68. See Joint Communiqué and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Russ.-Swed., Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382 (1996) [hereinafter Joint Communiqué].
69. Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization (TFSDU) identified five
major areas for consideration: first, trade policies, opportunities, and barriers (focusing on
the harvesting of marine mammals and fur bearing animals); second, case studies of sustainable renewable resource use; third, an environmental impact assessment; fourth, a
communication and education strategy; and fifth, regional applications of Agenda 21. See
Evelyn M. Hurwich, Arctic, 6 Y.B. OF INT’L ENVTL. L. 298, 302 (1996). Compare this to the
present work of the SDWG, http://portal.sdwg.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2009).
70. “A joint secretariat, led by the Chair of Senior Arctic Officials (SAO), will be
established in Tromsø for the period 2006-2012,” Arctic Council, Norwegian, Danish,
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was the case in the AEPS, there is no permanent, mandatory funding mechanism in the Council, although a project support instrument has been created to pool resources for funding of individual
projects.71 Finally, and importantly, both the AEPS and the Arctic
Council were established via a declaration as soft-law organizations, not inter-governmental organizations having binding
decision-making power.
Hence, even though many have cherished the argument that
the Council can be formalized into an inter-governmental organization, given that Arctic cooperation has already once been revised
in its short life-cycle, it is important to keep in mind that the foundation of the cooperation has remained much the same, allowing
us to conclude that the Arctic Council is fairly resistant
to
change.
But even though the structure has remained much the same,
the Arctic Council has become a stronger forum for cooperation
over the years of its existence. In addition to the changes identified
above, the working groups have become stronger in status and in
terms of their deliverables. This is due to the fact that it was
bound to take a few years before these working groups could start
functioning effectively. Increasingly, their strategies and deliverables have become more ambitious. The Council ministers have
also adopted important, albeit not very strong, policy recommendations connected with major scientific assessments, such as the
ACIA. After the release of the ACIA, climate change considerations
have become a cross-cutting issue in the Council, placing pressure
on the working groups to adjust their work to future challenges.
There is also more interest in the work of the Council; major states
(like China) are interested in becoming observers.
2. The Role of the EU
The EU plays an important role in the Council even though it
participates only as an ad hoc observer. Three of the eight Arctic
Council members are Member States of the Union; namely Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Moreover, seven out of the eight nonArctic states observers to the Council are Member States of the
Union: Italy (ad hoc status), Spain, France, the Netherlands, Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, who are increasingly deSwedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006-2012, http://arcticcouncil.org/article/2007/11/common_priorities (last visited Dec. 17, 2009). Individual
working groups have had their secretariats from the beginning of the AEPS.
71. See Nordic Env’t Fin. Corp., Arctic Council Project Support Instrument,
http://www.nefco.org/financing/arctic_council_project_support (last visited July 25, 2009).
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manding a better position in the Council.72 The current Arctic
Council chair, Norway, is trying to meet these expectations in its
chair-period by enhancing their participation in the work of the
Council.73 As studied below, the Commission is currently planning
its future Arctic policy, which may lead to the EU demanding a
better position in the Arctic Council.
3. The Role of Canada
Canada played a leadership role in creating the Arctic Council.
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney proposed the idea of the
Council during a visit to Leningrad in November 1989.74 In November 1990, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Joe Clark, declared that he would bring the issue of the Arctic
Council to the attention of the other States.75 On September 19,
1996, Canada hosted a meeting in Ottawa where representatives
from the eight Arctic states signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.76
Canada continues to play an active role in Arctic Council administration and project activities. Canada recently vice-chaired
the PAME Working Group.77 Canada, along with the United States
and Finland, is leading the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
(AMSA).78 Canada, together with Iceland, took a lead role in updating and revising the Arctic Regional Programme of Action for
the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-based Activities.79
While Norway, as part of its chairmanship, has committed to
reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of the Arctic Council,80
72. See
Non-Arctic
Countries
Want
Membership
in
Arctic
Council,
BARENTOBSERVER . COM , Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.barentsobserver.com/non-arcticcountries-want-membership-in-arctic-council.4516094-16174.html.
73. See id.
74. David VanderZwaag et al., The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Arctic
Council and Multilateral Environmental Initiatives: Tinkering While the Arctic Marine
Environment Totters, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 154 (2002).
75. Id.
76. Joint Communiqué, supra note 68.
77. That vice-chair was Chris Cuddy, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. For more
information on PAME, see Arctic Council, Prot. of the Marine Env’t Working Group,
Chairmanship 2006-2008, http://arctic-council.org/working_group/pame (last visited
Dec. 17, 2009).
78. See Arctic Council, PROT. OF MARINE ENV’T, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING
ASSESSMENT 2009 R EPORT (2009) 10, available at http://pame.is/images/stories
/PDF_Files/AMSA_2009_report_2nd_print.pdf
79. PROT. OF MARINE ENV’T WORKING GROUP, DRAFT WORKING GROUP MEETING
REPORT NO. I-2008 12 (2008).
80. Senior Arctic Officials have in fact placed the topic “Effectiveness and Efficiency”
as a standing item on the SAO agenda. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, MEETING OF SENIOR ARCTIC
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Canada has not taken an active role in trying to envision the future of the Council. Academic commentary in Canada has been
critical of the Canadian Government’s disproportionate emphasis
on national defense and security, the marginalization of circumpolar diplomacy, and the lack of a leadership role in promoting regional cooperation.81 One Canadian author has urged development
of a national Arctic strategy that, among other things, should address ways to bring the Arctic Council into the
twenty-first century.82
III. SHIFTING SEASCAPE
A. Introduction
As discussed above, the Arctic Council is the predominant inter-governmental forum dealing with the Arctic in general, including also Arctic marine issues. The Council has done important assessment work (sometimes with policy recommendations) relating
to the Arctic Ocean and produced non-legally binding guidelines
and manuals of good practice. These have often been influential in
many international environmental protection processes. Of the
Arctic Council Working Groups, the most important marine policy
work is done by PAME.
PAME’s agenda has become increasingly ambitious with the
adoption of its 2004 Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP), which
encourages actions on many fronts.83 PAME developed the AMSP
through the various Arctic Council working groups and mechanisms, as well as via regional and global bodies.84 The AMSP identiOFFICIALS: FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/
Sao%20Svolvaer%20Final%20Report.pdf [hereinafter 2008 A RC TIC C OUNCI L
SENIOR REPORT].
81. See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Can. Int’l Council Junior Fellow, Arctic Front, Arctic
Homeland: Re-Evaluating Canada’s Past Record and Future Prospects in the Circumpolar
North (Can. Int’l Council, Preliminary Paper, July 2008), available at
http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/download/resourcece/archives/foreignpol/cic_la
cken; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Can. Intl. Council Junior Fellow, From Polar Race to Polar
Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World (Foreign Policy for
Canada’s Tomorrow No. 3, July 2009), available at http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/
download/resourcece/archives/foreignpol/cicfpctno3.
82. Franklyn Griffiths, Can. Int’l Council Senior Fellow, Towards a Canadian Arctic
Strategy (Can. Int’l Council, Preliminary Paper, July 2008), available at
http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/download/research/foreignpol/towardsaca~2/ci
cfpctno1; Franklyn Griffiths, Can. Int’l Council Senior Fellow, Towards a Canadian Arctic
Strategy (Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow No. 1, July 2009), available at
http://www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org/download/research/foreignpol/towardsaca~2/cicfpctno1.
83. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE STRATEGIC PLAN (2004), available at
http://www.pame.is/images/stories/AMSP_files/AMSP-Nov-2004.pdf
84. Id. at 1.
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fies the largest drivers of change in the Arctic to be climate change
and increasing economic activity and suggests actions in many
areas, for instance: conducting a comprehensive assessment of Arctic marine shipping, which led to the AMSA being finalized in
2009; developing guidelines and procedures for port reception facilities for ship-generated wastes and residues; examining the adequacy of Arctic Council’s Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines,
with revision, in 2009; identifying potential areas where new
guidelines and codes of practice for the marine environment are
needed; promoting application of the ecosystem approach; promoting the establishment of marine protected areas, including a representative network; calling for periodic reviews of both international and regional agreements and standards; and promoting implementation of contaminant-related conventions or programs and
possible additional global and regional actions.
Overall, the Council has clear strengths. It now serves as a
high-level platform for all the Arctic, internationally oriented, actors (not those who actually govern the Arctic, such as the Arctic
sub-units of federal states and other administrative units).85 It has
also produced scientific assessments, mainly via its strongest
working group, AMAP, which has made a significant difference to
regional and even global environmental negotiation processes.86
The Council is also the only inter-governmental forum that accords
indigenous peoples a very strong status as permanent participants
(not NGOs as they are usually deemed).87
Yet, it must be acknowledged that with the present weak institutional structure, lack of any permanent funding mechanism, lack
of legal status, etc., the Council cannot reasonably be expected to
continue to be more than a platform for discussions on Arctic issues and a producer of scientific assessments and non-legally binding guidelines, rather than a governing body. Hence, from the
viewpoint of governing the Arctic Ocean (or Arctic marine areas in
general) and the coming climate change challenges, it is fairly
85. Even the Northern Forum, an observer to the Council, which ostensibly represents
many counties in the north, does not really represent the interests of the counties but serves
more as a low-key forum for their mutual cooperation. Contrast this to the draft Arctic
Region Council proposal circulated by Canada in AEPS negotiations, which would have
directly included those administrative units in its institutional structure.
86. See, e.g., Lars-Otto Reiersen et al., Circumpolar Perspectives on Persistent Organic
Pollutants: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, in NORTHERN LIGHTS
AGAINST POPS: COMBATING TOXIC THREATS IN THE ARCTIC 60 (David Leonard Downie &
Terry Fenge eds., 2003).
87. It is good to remember that these organizations do not directly represent the
Arctic governance bodies that represent indigenous peoples, but are their international
organizations (and need to represent either many indigenous peoples in one Arctic country
or one indigenous people in many Arctic countries).
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clear that the Arctic Council is limited with its present structure
and mandate.
B. Challenges to the Present Regime from the Part of Observers to
the Arctic Council
Increasingly, scholars, as well as international and nongovernmental organizations that are observers to the Council,
have started to criticize the way it conducts its work in general
and its environmental protection mandate, in particular. The various processes by IUCN, WWF Arctic, UNEP Grid-Arendal and
Arctic parliamentarians that have studied the possibility of an
Arctic treaty have ended up with recommendations containing two
features: an audit to assess the effectiveness and relevance of existing regimes as a basis for the second step and a discussion concerning the possibility of developing an Arctic treaty.88 In their
August 2006 meeting in Kiruna, the Conference of Arctic Parliamentarians asked that their governments and the institutions of
the European Union, “‘[i]n light of the impact of climate change,
and the increasing economic and human activity, initiate, as a
matter of urgency, an audit of existing legal regimes that impact
the Arctic and to continue the discussion about strengthening or
adding to them where necessary.”89
In a seminar co-hosted by UNEP, Grid-Arendal, and the Standing Committee of the Arctic Parliamentarians on Multilateral
Agreements and Their Relevance to the Arctic, in September 2006,
the participants agreed on one overall recommendation:
The participants of the Arendal Seminar recommend
that UNEP, the Arctic Parliamentarians, the Arctic
Council, the Nordic Council of Ministers, and Contracting Parties, governing bodies and secretariats to
the MEAs [multilateral environmental agreements]
support and cooperate on an audit to assess the effectiveness and relevance of MEAs in the Arctic and to
examine the need and options for improving the existing regime as well as the need and options for devel88. The only exception is the Nordic Council, which went further and adopted the
following recommendation: “[t]he Nordic Council recommends to the Nordic Council of Ministers . . . that efforts be made, in co-operation with the Arctic Council, to establish an Artic
treaty.” Nordic Council, Committee Proposal on Jurisprudential Research in the Marine
Areas in the North and an Arctic Treaty 3 (Apr. 26, 2006) (on file with author) (emphasis
in original).
89. MARTIN PALM, THE SEVENTH CONFERENCE OF THE PARLIAMENTARIANS OF THE
ARCTIC REGION 23 (2007).
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oping an Arctic Treaty or Arctic Framework Convention. The audit should take into account recommendations from the Kiruna Conference of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and the
Arendal Seminar.90
A similar conclusion was reached by the IUCN, which convened
an expert meeting in Ottawa on March 24-25, 2004 to discuss
whether the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) could provide the
needed input for the development of environmental protection in
the Arctic. The expert meeting was divided over the way in which
environmental protection could and should be developed in the
Arctic and whether a treaty approach was needed. The main approach to Arctic governance advanced at the meeting was not to
borrow from the Antarctic experience but to first study which environmental threats to the Arctic should be addressed at which level:
i.e., universal (global treaties and processes), regional (the Arctic
Council), bilateral, national and sub-national.91
Hence, there clearly seems to be pressure from the abovementioned commentators of the Arctic Council to at least examine the
applicable treaties carefully, studying in particular how these treaties are implemented in the region and whether, on the basis of
that analysis, a comprehensive/framework instrument for the Arctic is called for. What these actions by observers of the Arctic
Council serve to demonstrate is that pressures are building to
adopt a treaty approach. Yet, the ultimate problem for those who
push for an Arctic treaty is that, at least at present, there are no
real signs from the Council and its member states that they would
be ready to support the treaty approach, at least in the
immediate future.
C. Recent Initiatives from the United States and the Arctic Ocean
Coastal States
There are interesting recent developments, some of which can
be seen even as challenging the Arctic Council as the main intergovernmental platform for governing the Arctic Ocean.
For many parts of the Arctic Ocean, the presence of ice for most
of the year has, so far, rendered national fisheries regulation for
those areas unnecessary. But, as diminishing ice-coverage may at90. NORDIC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THE ARENDAL SEMINAR ON MULTILATERAL
RONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THE ARTIC 2 (2006).

ENVI-

91. See Wolfgang E. Burhenne, The Arctic: Towards a New Environmental Regime?,
37 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 249, 255 (2007).
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tract fishing vessels looking for possible new fishing opportunities,
Arctic states may be required to develop national regulations in
order to discharge their obligations under international law, including those under the LOS Convention and the Fish Stocks
Agreement. The United States is currently engaged in this process
with regard to fishing in the maritime zones off Alaska north of
the Bering Strait. In the United States, competence over fisheries
is shared by the individual states (in this case Alaska) within three
nautical miles from shore, and the federal government in the remainder of the United States maritime zones. The North Pacific
Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) plays a key role in federal
regulation with regard to the maritime zones of the United States
in the North Pacific. The NPFMC has adopted various fishery
management plans (FMPs) that apply as far north as the Bering
Strait, and its King and Tanner Crab and Scallop FMPs also apply
to that part of the Chukchi Sea that lies between the Bering Strait
and Point Hope. In June 2007, the NPFMC closed the Northern
Bering Sea to bottom trawling and directed a research plan to be
developed for that area.92
Since October 2006, the NPFMC has also specifically focused
its attention on Arctic fishery management. This has led to the development of an Arctic FMP which is likely to be adopted at the
February 2009 meeting of the Council. The Draft Arctic FMP proposes, inter alia, to “close the Arctic to commercial fishing until
information improves so that fishing can be conducted sustainably
and with due concern to other ecosystem components.”93
As some of the fish stocks in the EEZ off Alaska are likely to be
transboundary, reference should be made to United States Senate
joint resolution (S.J. Res.) No. 17 of 2008, directing the United
States to “. . . initiate international discussions and take necessary
steps with other Arctic nations to negotiate an agreement or
agreements for managing migratory, transboundary, and straddling fish stocks in the Arctic Ocean. . . .”94 The House of Repre92. NEWS & NOTES (N. Pacific Fishery Mgmt. Council), June 2007, at 2, available at
http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/newsletters/news606.pdf.
93. N. PACIFIC FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, PRELIMINARY PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT / REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW / INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS FOR THE ARCTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND AMENDMENT 29 TO THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND TANNER CRABS at
iii (2008), available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/analyses/arctic/ArcticFMP_EA1108.pdf. At
its February 2009 meeting, the Council still needs to decide on different “alternatives” and
“options” linked to them. See NEWS & NOTES (N. Pacific Fishery Mgmt. Council), Dec. 2008,
at 2, available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/newsletters/news1208.pdf.
94. S.J. Res. 17-2, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) (passed by the House of Representatives on May 21, 2008, and signed by President George W. Bush on June 3, 2008, thereafter
Pub. L. No. 110-243, 122 Stat. 1569).
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sentatives voted in favor of S.J. Res. No. 17 in May 2007, and the
President signed it on June 4, 2008. The current United States
Administration has so far informed Canada and the Russian Federation of SJ Res. No. 17 of 2008, and has expressed its willingness
to engage in exploratory talks on the issue. The United States also
brought S.J. Res. No. 17 of 2008 to the attention of SAOs during
their meeting in November 2007. During the discussion that followed “[t]here was strong support for building on and considering
this issue within the context of existing mechanisms.”95 This would
seem to indicate that a considerable majority of the Arctic states
does not want the Arctic Council to become directly involved in fishery management and conservation.
Pursuant to S.J. Res. No. 17 of 2008, the United States has also
approached a number of relevant players, including the other Arctic Ocean coastal states, on their willingness to support a process
which would culminate in a general statement or declaration on
present and future Arctic fisheries. At the Session of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in March 2009, the United States plans
to convene a side event to discuss this process. The United States
may approach another Arctic Ocean coastal state, for instance
Norway, to co-sponsor this initiative. At this side event, the United
States may offer to host a high-level conference on Arctic fisheries
in 2010, during which such a general statement or declaration
could be adopted.96 The European Commission’s Arctic Communication97 would seem to be supportive of such an initiative.98 Finally, it should be mentioned that on January 9, 2009, President Bush
approved the long-awaited Arctic Region Policy 99 of the
United States.
Perhaps the most significant development in regard to managing the Arctic Ocean comes from the part of the five Arctic Ocean
coastal states. They started their cooperation with the meeting between senior officials in October 2007 in Norway. This was followed by the May 2008 meeting in Greenland, where the political
95. ARCTIC COUNCIL, MEETING OF SENIOR ARCTIC OFFICIALS: FINAL REPORT 12 (2007),
available at http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/Narvik%20-FINAL%20Report-%2023Apr08.doc.
96. Information based on conversations between Erik J. Molenaar and a governmental official of the United States in December 2008 and January 2009. Presidential Policy
Directive, supra note 22, § III(H)(6), does not refer to the possibility of such a process in the
relevant implementation section.
97. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: The European Union and the Arctic Region, COM (2008) 763 (Nov. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter Arctic Region Communication].
98. It is observed “[u]ntil a conservation and management regime is in place for the
areas not yet covered by such a regime, no new fisheries should commence.” Id. at 8.
99. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 22.
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representatives of these countries outlined an agenda for action. In
their conference declaration (Ilulissat Declaration) they note that
they “. . . see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean” but are willing to work
within the framework of existing treaties and institutions, especially the law of the sea.100 Yet, they did outline several areas for
future cooperating including work through the IMO against shipbased pollution, strengthening their search and rescue capabilities,
cooperation in sharing data on continental shelf, etc. Interestingly,
they also affirmed their intent to continue in the Arctic Council,
but also in other relevant forums, signaling that they indeed may
pursue a new form of cooperation focusing on the Arctic Ocean.
This new incipient form of cooperation, if it really takes off,
may over time challenge the Arctic Council, in that the other three
members of the Council have not been invited to these two meetings. It may be that with the melting ice, the Arctic Ocean coastal
state cooperation will grow stronger, given that there a is need to
take stronger policy actions in higher stake policy areas (fisheries
and shipping) than those that can be pursued in the Arctic Council
with respect to the Arctic marine area, in particular the Arctic
Ocean. This move by the five Arctic Ocean coastal states has already caused friction between them and the three Council members not invited to the Greenland meeting. In the Narvik SAO
meeting, Iceland expressed concern over why the Arctic Council
members were not invited.101 On the other hand, just before the
Greenland meeting, Denmark briefed the SAOs that the meeting
would not compete with the Arctic Council.102
D. EU Arctic Policy Developments
In connection with its climate policy work, the EU also pro100. Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7, at 2.
101. See ARCTIC COUNCIL, supra note 90, at 20 (providing that Iceland “expressed
concerns that separate meetings of the five Arctic states, Denmark, Norway, US, Russia and
Canada, on Arctic issues without the participation of the members of the Arctic Council,
Sweden, Finland and Iceland, could create a new process that competes with the objectives
of the Arctic Council. If issues of broad concern to all of the Arctic Council Member States,
including the effect of climate change, shipping in the Arctic, etc. are to be discussed,
Iceland requested that Denmark invite the other Arctic Council states to participate in the
ministerial meeting. Permanent participants also requested to participate in the meeting.
Denmark responded that the capacity of the venue may be an issue.”).
102. In the Svolvaer SAO meeting (23-24.4.2008), it was provided that “Denmark
updated on preparations for its meeting of the 5 Arctic coastal states. The meeting will focus
on issues of concern for the 5 states and is intended to strengthen, and not compete with,
other relevant fora. PPs inquired as to their role in the meeting and Denmark confirmed
that the conference is intended for governments”. See 2008 ARCTIC COUNCIL SENIOR
REPORT, supra note 80, at 15.
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posed to revisit the governance framework applicable to the Arctic
marine area.103 The Climate Change and International Security
paper identified one policy option to “[d]evelop an EU Arctic policy
based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into
account, [inter alia], access to resources and the opening of new
trade routes.”104 The EU is also developing its Arctic policy as part
of its newly adopted integrated maritime policy wherein the Commission (DG Mare) promises to produce a report “on strategic issues relating to the Arctic Ocean” within the year 2008.105
Most recently, the Commission issued its Arctic Communication.106 In the Introduction to the thirteen page document, the
Commission sets out EU interests and proposes action for EU
Member States and institutions around three main
policy objectives:
•
•
•

Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with
its population
Promoting sustainable use of resources
Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance107

The Communication is structured along these three main policy objectives. One of the salient features within “[p]romoting sustainable use of resources” is the proposal to extend the spatial
scope of the NEAFC Convention (see subsection IV.B.). As the section “[c]ontributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” is
of most interest for this paper, some more attention is devoted to it
103. HIGH REPRESENTATIVE & EUR. COMM’N TO EU. COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf.
104. Id. at 11. See also id. at 8, which states, “[t]he Arctic: [t]he rapid melting of the
polar ice caps, in particular, the Arctic, is opening up new waterways and international
trade routes. In addition, the increased accessibility of the enormous hydrocarbon resources
in the Arctic region is changing the geo-strategic dynamics of the region with potential consequences for international stability and European security interests. The resulting new
strategic interests are illustrated by the recent planting of the Russian flag under the North
Pole. There is an increasing need to address the growing debate over territorial claims and
access to new trade routes by different countries which challenge Europe's ability to effectively secure its trade and resource interests in the region and may put pressure on its relations with key partners.”
105. The adopted integrated maritime policy provides that, “[a]ttention will also be
given to the geopolitical implications of climate change. In this context, the Commission will
present in 2008 a report on strategic issues relating to the Arctic Ocean”. Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An Integrated Maritime Policy for the
European Union, at §4.4, COM (2007) 574 final (Oct. 10, 2007), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUrierv.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF [hereinafter Integrated Maritime Policy].
106. See Arctic Region Communication, supra note 97.
107. Id. at 3.
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here. As a general comment, it should be noted that the section
contains quite a few sentences that would raise the eyebrows of
international lawyers and would have benefited from more accurate drafting. The section contains the following policy objectives:
•

•

•

•

The EU should work to uphold the further development of a cooperative Arctic governance system based
on the UNCLOS which would ensure:
o security and stability
o strict environmental management, including
respect of the precautionary principle
o sustainable use of resources as well as open
and equitable access
The full implementation of already existing obligations, rather than proposing new legal instruments
should be advocated. This however should not preclude work on further developing some of the frameworks, adapting them to new conditions or Arctic specificities.
The EU should promote broad dialogue and negotiated solutions and not support arrangements which
exclude any of the Arctic EU Member States or Arctic
EEA EFTA countries.
Arctic considerations should be integrated into wider
EU policies and negotiations.108

Subsequently, a list of policy actions is offered. These include:
•

Explore the possibility of establishing new, multi-sector
frameworks for integrated ecosystem management. This
could include the establishment of a network of marine protected areas, navigational measures and rules for ensuring
the sustainable exploitation of minerals.
• Enhance input to the Arctic Council in accordance with the
Community’s role and potential. As a first step, the Commission will apply for permanent observer status in the
Arctic Council.
....
• Explore all possibilities at international level to promote
measures for protecting marine biodiversity in areas
beyond national jurisdiction, including through the pursuit
of an UNCLOS Implementing Agreement.
108. Id. at 10.
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Work towards the successful conclusion of international negotiations on marine protected areas on the high seas.109

A few comments are offered here. First, the preference for implementation “rather than proposing new legal instruments” in the
section on policy objectives does not seem to be very absolute in
view of the support for the “possibility of establishing new, multisector frameworks for integrated ecosystem management.”110 The
words “based on UNCLOS”, in the section on policy objectives,
nevertheless, indicate that the option of an Implementing Agreement under the LOS Convention is no longer being pursued. At the
end of the discussion of this option, in subsection IV.E., some attention is also devoted to an earlier EU proposal for an Implementing Agreement under the LOS Convention. It is not altogether
clear, however, why such an initiative with a global scope should
be listed in this Arctic Communication. The same comment also
applies to the last policy action that is quoted above. While the
precise meaning and intention of this policy action is not clear,111 it
seems to relate to a process at the global level that is intended to
have output that applies throughout the globe and not just the
Arctic. Or does it imply that the high seas in the Arctic Ocean
should be designated as a marine protected area?
The European Parliament and individual Member States have
also pressed for stronger positions in their Arctic policy. The European Parliament, in its resolution of October 9, 2008 on
Arctic governance:
Suggests that the Commission should be prepared to
pursue the opening of international negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international
treaty for the protection of the Arctic, having as its
inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by
the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting
the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the consequent rights
and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region; believes, however, that as a minimum startingpoint such a treaty could at least cover the unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the

109. Id. at 11.
110. Id.
111. The sentences quoted in infra note 163 indicate that this policy action should have
been merged with the policy action on the Implementation Agreement.
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Arctic Ocean.112
Arguably, however, priority in reform lies with areas within national jurisdiction because the impacts of climate change and the
ensuing human activities will occur there first. Limiting reform to
areas beyond national jurisdiction would place coastal states in a
more advantageous position, vis-à-vis other states, due to lower
costs/higher profits or transboundary effects.
The individual EU Member States that have a status of observer to the Arctic Council, which form seven out of eight nonArctic states observers to the Council, have also started to demand
a better position in the Arctic Council, some even suggesting to
apply for membership.113
It can be asked whether the Arctic Ocean coastal state cooperation can be seen as a threat from the perspective of the EU. The
EU has participated in the ministers of the Council as an ad hoc
observer, given that three of its member states (Finland, Sweden,
and Denmark) are members of the Council. In addition, Iceland
and Norway have to implement much of the EU regulation as parties to the EEA agreement. On the other hand, it is important to
note that Greenland, Svalbard, and their adjacent maritime zones
are not covered by the EU or the EEA Agreement, since Greenland
chose to exit the then EEC in 1985, following a referendum, and
Svalbard was excluded from the EEA agreement given that it is
governed by the international 1920 Svalbard Treaty.114 The EU,
thus, does not have any Arctic coastline, but it does possess significant fisheries and shipping interests in the opening new sea area,
now studied under its climate policy and integrated maritime policy. If the Arctic Ocean coastal state cooperation continues in real,
and Greenland self-rule from Denmark is increasing by the day,
some even predicting independence in a foreseeable future,115 the
112. EUR. PARL. DOC. P6_TA-PROV(2008)0474 3 (2008).
113. It was reported in Barents Observer, e.g., that “Italian Foreign Minister Franco
Frattini said his country wants to become member of the organisation because of ‘the
geopolitical and strategic importance of the Arctic region. . . .’ ”. Non-arctic Countries Want
Membership in Arctic Council, B ARENTS O BSERVER . COM , Oct. 3, 2008, available at
http://www.barentsobserver.com/non-arctic-countries-want-membership-in-arcticcouncil.4516094-16174.html [hereinafter Non-Arctic Countries].
114. Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 8. A
special Protocol was adopted as part of the EEA Agreement to the effect that Norway may
decide whether to apply the EEA Agreement to Svalbard or not (Protocol 40). Norway decided to exclude the Islands. See also GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE SVALBARD TREATY: FROM TERRA
NULLIUS TO NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY 299 (1995).
115. See ArcticPortal.org, From Remote Island to Self-Government - Greenland’s
Journey Towards Independence, http://arcticportal.org/features/2009/from-remote-island-toself-government-greenlands-journey-towards-independence (recent news release on Arctic
Council’s website) (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
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EU will find itself excluded from this cooperation altogether.
Hence, it is one possible trajectory that the EU will continue to
push for other kinds of governance arrangements, where it can
play a more influential role than in the Arctic Council or in the
Arctic Ocean coastal state cooperation. This would seem to prompt
the EU to push for a more comprehensive Arctic legal governance
arrangement, at least from the longer term perspective.
E. The Role of Canada
Canada has not been an advocate of formalizing regional cooperation among the Arctic Ocean coastal states, but instead has
largely preferred bilateral cooperative arrangements.116 In 1983,
Canada forged a marine environmental cooperation agreement
with Denmark,117 which pledges the provision of information and
consultation over proposed undertakings carrying a significant
risk of transboundary pollution in the Nares Strait, Baffin Bay,
and Davis Strait region. The agreement has also established joint
marine contingency plans for pollution incidents from shipping or
offshore hydrocarbon exploration/exploitation. In 1977, Canada
agreed with the United States to establish a joint marine contingency plan for the Beaufort Sea and the plan has been periodically
revised.118 Canada and the Russian Federation have entered into
various agreements relating to environmental and
economic cooperation.119
In the wake of the Ilulissat Declaration, it seems likely that
116. For a more detailed summary of Canada’s cooperative arrangements relating to
marine environmental protection and living marine resource management, see R. Siron,
David L. VanderZwaag & H. Fast, Ecosystem-based Ocean Management in the Canadian
Arctic, in BEST PRACTICES IN ECOSYSTEM-BASED OCEANS MANAGEMENT IN THE ARCTIC
(Hakon Hoel ed., Norwegian Polar Inst., Report Series No. 129, Tromsø, Nor. 2009)
(published under the auspices of the Arctic Council).
117. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Kingdom of Denmark for Cooperation Relating to the Marine Environment, Can.-Den., Aug.
26, 1983, 1983 Can. T.S. No. 19.
118. Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the United States of America Constituting an Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a
Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, July 28, 1977, 1977 Can. T.S. No. 25.
119. See Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between Canada and the Russian
Federation, June 19, 1992, 1993 Can. T.S. No. 23; Canada-Russian Federation Agreement
Concerning Environmental Cooperation, May 8, 1993, 1993 Can. T.S. No. 7; Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Cooperation in the Arctic and the North, June 19, 1992, 1992 Can. T.S. No. 18; Agreement
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Economic Cooperation, May 8, 1993, 1994 Can. T.S. No. 38; Memorandum of Understanding
Between the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (Canada) and the
Ministry of Regional Development of the Russian Federation Concerning Cooperation on
Aboriginal and Northern Development, Nov. 29, 2007, available at http://www.aininac.gc.ca/ap/pubs/mourus/mourus-eng.asp.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2081919

Spring, 2009]

ARCTIC OCEAN GOVERNANCE

275

Canada and the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states will, at least
in the near term, avoid a comprehensive regional sea agreement120
in favor of sectoral cooperative initiatives. For example, a regional
agreement on search and rescue may become a priority in light of
increased Arctic shipping.121 Working through the IMO to better
protect the Arctic marine environment from vessel-source pollution
has already been occurring through the revision process122 for the
Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters.123
Further regional cooperation may follow in light of recommendations from the AMSA. Designating the Arctic Ocean, or parts thereof, as a special area, where stricter than normal pollution standards for oil, noxious liquid substances and garbage would apply,
is a possible governance avenue.124
On the domestic front, Canada has substantially shifted, under
the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, towards a sovereignty and security agenda for the Arctic. To defend Canadian
sovereignty over the Arctic, the Government has committed to constructing up to eight Polar Class Arctic offshore patrol ships able
to patrol the length of the Northwest Passage during the summer
navigable season and its approaches year round.125 Establishing a
Canadian Forces Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut
and constructing a docking and refueling facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut to serve as a staging area for naval vessels and Canadian
Coast Guard vessels operating in the North are further commitments.126 In the 2008 Budget, the Government pledged $720 mil120. For a recent call for such an agreement, see Louise Angélique de La Fayette,
Ocean Governance in the Arctic, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 531 (2008).
121. Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7 (highlighting the need to further strengthen
search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic Ocean). Ministers at the Sixth
Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council on April 29, 2009, through the Tromsø Declaration, approved the establishment of a task force to negotiate by the next Ministerial meeting
in 2011 an international instrument on search and rescue in the Arctic.
122. A correspondence group under the coordination of Canada was established to
revise the Guidelines and the Guidelines have been extended to cover Antarctic waters as
well. IMO, Mar. Safety Comm., Report of the Maritime Safety Committee on its Eighty-Sixth
Session, Annex 18, MSC 86/26/Add.2 (2009).
123. IMO Doc. MSC/Circ. 1056, MEPC/Circ. 399 (Dec. 23, 2002).
124. The technical report on Governance of Arctic Marine Shipping, prepared for
AMSA, suggested as one option designating the Arctic Ocean beyond national jurisdiction,
as a special area. VANDERZWAAG, supra note 57, at Finding 11. The AMSA Report
subsequently recommended that Arctic states explore the need for special area designations
through the IMO. ARCTIC COUNCIL, ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT 2009 REPORT
7 (2009).
125. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Prime Minister Stephen Harper
Announces New Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships: Canada’s New Government to Move Forward
With Deep Water Port in Arctic (July 9, 2007), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/
media.asp?category=1&id=1742.
126. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Prime Minister Announces
Expansion of Canadian Forces Facilities and Operations in the Arctic (Aug. 10, 2007),
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lion CDN for the construction of a new Polar Class icebreaker.127
In August 2008, the Prime Minister announced the Government’s
intention to extend the coverage of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act beyond the present 100 nautical miles to 200 nautical
miles and to require mandatory reporting from all ships destined
for Arctic waters within the same 200 nautical miles zone.128
Getting a firm grip on future directions for Canadian Arctic
policy is not easy since the Government has largely favoured an
incremental approach to policy formulation. In the October 2007
Throne Speech, Stephen Harper pledged to bring forward an integrated northern strategy having four pillars, namely, strengthening Canada’s sovereignty, protecting the environment, promoting
economic and social development, and improving and developing
northern governance.129 The speech also announced that Canada
would build a world-class Arctic research station to serve the world
in cutting edge issues, including environmental science and resource development.130
The location and parameters of the proposed Arctic research
station remain uncertain. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
prepared a Visioning Workshop Report on proposed scientific priorities for the station.131 The department then commissioned an international panel of experts to provide a critique of the document
and further advise on future directions for Arctic research. In an
October 2008 report, the panel suggested a change in terminology
from “research station,” implying “a physical structure—or cluster
of structures” to a broader term, “Canadian Arctic Research Initiative.”132 The panel concluded that such an initiative “will likely require a two-hub model with a logistical hub in a central, accessible
location as well as a scientific hub in an attractive and scientifically interesting area.”133 The need for a “transparent decisionavailable at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp? category+1&id=1784.
127. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, Northern Strategy – Backgrounder
(Mar. 10, 2008), available at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2016.
128. Press Release, Office of Can. Prime Minister, PM Announces Government of
Canada Will Extend Jurisdiction over Arctic Waters (Aug. 27 2008), available at
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category= 1&id=2248. An Act to amend the Arctic Waters
Pollution Prevention Act, 2009 S.C., ch. 11 (Can.), receiving Royal Assent on 11 June 2009
and coming into force on August 1, 2009, subsequently formalized the extension.
129. Stephen Harper, Can. Prime Minister, Strong Leadership. A Better Canada.
Address from the Throne to Open Second Session of the 37th Parliament of Canada (Oct.
16, 2007).
130. Id.
131. INT’L EXPERT PANEL ON SCI. PRIORITIES FOR CAN. ARCTIC RES. INITIATIVE, VISION
FOR THE C ANADIAN A RCTIC R ESEARCH I NITIATIVE : A SSESSING THE O PPORTUNITIES
app. A (2008).
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 16.
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making process” by which possible models and sites are considered
and chosen was emphasized.134
Only in July 2009 did the Government of Canada release a
Northern Strategy document,135 but the document remains quite
general and vague on future international policy directions for the
Arctic. For example, the Northern Strategy states that Canada
will continue to manage its maritime boundary and jurisdictional
disputes with the United States and Denmark in a cooperative
manner and may seek to resolve them in the future in accordance
with international law.136 While the Strategy emphasizes Canada’s
commitment to ensuring the Arctic Council has the necessary
strength, resources, and influence to respond effectively to emerging challenges, no detailed vision for the Council is provided.137
One can expect Canada’s policy to evolve through further speeches
and funding initiatives.138
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A. Introduction
A range of options for strengthening ocean governance in the
Arctic exist. “Soft law” approaches include, among others: harmonization of environmental and technical standards by coastal
states in key sectors such as shipping, fishing, and hydrocarbon
exploration/exploitation; development of integrated ocean planning
initiatives for transboundary marine ecosystems, for example, the
Barents, Beaufort, and Bering Seas;139 and restructuring the Arctic
Council, including by broadening participation.140
Various “hard law” approaches have also been proposed, in134. Id. at 17. On February 20, 2009, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, the Honourable Chuck Strahl, announced the undertaking of a feasibility
study for the proposed Arctic research station with three locations in Nunavut being
considered – Cambridge Bay, Pond Inlet, and Resolute. See Indian & N. Aff. Can.,
Feasibility Study for Canada’s new High Arctic Research Station, http://www.aincinac.gc.ca/nth/st/fs-eng.asp?p1=1036190&p2=1064486 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
135. GOV’T OF CAN., CANADA’S NORTHERN STRATEGY: OUR NORTH, OUR HERITAGE, OUR
FUTURE (2009), available at http://www.northernstrategy.gc.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp.
136. See id. at 7.
137. See id. at 15.
138. The
government’s
website,
Gov’t
of
Can.,
Canada’s
Northern
Strategy, www.northernstrategy.gc.ca (last visited Jan. 22, 2010, will need to be consulted
to track the various updates.
139. The PAME Working Group has already established a Large Marine Ecosystem
Expert Group and PAME has committed to moving the ecosystem approach forward in three
pilot areas, namely the West Bering, Barents and Beaufort Seas. See PROGRAM FOR PROT.
OF ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, DRAFT WORKING GROUP MEETING REPORT NO. I-2008
16-17 (2008).
140. See Non-Arctic Countries, supra note 113.
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cluding, among others: negotiating a regional seas agreement with
protocols;141 establishing a new regional ocean management organization for governing areas beyond national jurisdiction;142 transforming the Arctic Council into a treaty-based organization;143 and
forging sectoral agreements for particular priorities such as search
and rescue and joint marine contingency planning.144
Rather than canvassing the full spectrum of governance options, the remainder of the discussion focuses on a few select options, namely adjusting the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention (subsection IV.B.), adjusting the spatial scope of the OSPAR
Convention (subsection IV.C.), and an Implementing Agreement
under the LOS Convention (subsection IV.D.). Finally, subsection
IV.E. concludes by highlighting the arguments for and against a
new, international, legally binding instrument for the governance
and regulation of the Arctic Ocean.
B. Adjusting the Spatial Scope of the NEAFC Convention
One of the options for addressing gaps in the regime for the governance and regulation of marine capture fisheries is the development of one or more state-of-the-art RFMOs or Arrangements
for species other than tuna, tuna-like species, and anadromous
species. This may require adjustments in the competence of existing RFMOs or Arrangements, in particular in geographical terms.
An obvious candidate for a spatial adjustment is the North-East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), established by the
NEAFC Convention.145 The five existing members of NEAFC are
the European Community (EC), Denmark on behalf of the Faroe
Islands and Greenland, Iceland, Norway, and the Russian Federation. Unlike the OSPAR Convention,146 the NEAFC Convention
does not explicitly mention the option of amending its spatial
scope. On the other hand, there is also nothing in Article 19, or
elsewhere in the NEAFC Convention that would preclude spatial
adjustments, as such.
It should be noted that the NEAFC Convention’s eastern boun141. See de La Fayette, supra note 120.
142. Rosemary Rayfuse, Melting Moments: The Future of Polar Oceans Governance in a
Warming World, 16(2) RECIEL 196 (2007); Rosemary Rayfuse, Protecting Marine
Biodiversity in Polar Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 17(1) RECIEL 3 (2008).
143. Timo Koivurova, Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty – Evaluation and a New
Proposal, 17(1) RECIEL 14 (2008).
144. The Ilulissat Declaration has already emphasized that search and rescue
cooperations are likely to become a high priority in light of increased Arctic support. See
Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 7.
145. NEAFC, supra note 8, art. 3.
146. OSPAR Convention, supra note 9.
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dary and the western boundary north of Greenland do not coincide
with the two relevant boundaries of FAO Statistical Area No. 18,
entitled “Arctic Sea.” While the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention is identical to the spatial scope of its 1959 predecessor,147
the two relevant boundaries of FAO Statistical Area No. 18 already existed in 1970 and have not changed since then.148 The spatial scope of the OSPAR Convention and its two predecessors, the
Oslo Convention149 and the Paris Convention,150 is also identical to
that of the NEAFC Convention (and its 1959 predecessor). Interestingly, the ICES Convention151 stipulates that the spatial mandate
of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)
is “the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas”152 but the northern
boundaries of the ICES Areas are identical to those of FAO Statistical Area No. 18.
The rationale for the northern boundaries of the predecessor to
the NEAFC Convention is not evident. Perhaps they simply demarcated the most northerly range of distribution that commercially significant fish stocks could possibly have, in the most optimistic scenario, and then moved just a bit further north to be on
the safe side. It should also be noted that until recently the exact
location of the northern boundaries did not have practical relevance for NEAFC.
While spatial adjustments are thus possible, it is submitted
that only relatively small geographical adjustments, expansions as
well as shrinkages, do not seem problematic. Such adjustments
could, for instance, follow maritime boundaries or ecosystem boundaries between different hydrographic regimes, submarine topography, and distributional ranges of certain target species or other
species.153 A well-known example of an international regulatory
regime whose spatial scope was mainly determined by ecosystem
boundaries is the CCAMLR Convention, by which the Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
147. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention art. 1, Jan. 24, 1959, 486 U.N.T.S.
157 (1964).
148. See the historical FAO statistical charts at FAO Fisheries & Agric. Dep’t, Fishing
Area Maps, ftp.fao.org/fi/maps/Default.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
149. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and
Aircraft art. 2, Feb. 15, 1972, 932 U.N.T.S. 3 (1974).
150. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources art.
2, June 4, 1974, 1546 U.N.T.S. 120 (1989).
151. Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Sept. 12
1964, 652 U.N.T.S. 237 (1968).
152. Id. art. 2.
153. See Lewis M. Alexander, Large Marine Ecosystems as Global Management Units,
in BIOMASS YIELDS AND GEOGRAPHY OF LARGE MARINE ECOSYSTEMS 339, 339-42 (Kenneth
Sherman & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1989).
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(CCAMLR) was established.154 Even in that case, however, the approximation of the Antarctic Convergence agreed to during the negotiation of the CCAMLR Convention took account of political considerations, thereby causing a small diversion from pre-existing
FAO Statistical Areas.155
For the purpose of adjusting the spatial scope of the NEAFC
Convention, account could perhaps be taken of the large marine
ecosystems (LMEs) of the Arctic marine area developed by
PAME.156 A quick comparison of these LMEs with the current spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention might suggest that, for instance, the latter’s spatial scope could be expanded by including all
of LME No. 20, entitled “Barents Sea,”157 and perhaps even LME
No. 58, entitled “Kara Sea.”158 Another option would be to restrict
the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention by excluding the spatial scope of LME No. 64, entitled “Arctic Ocean.”159 The spatial
scope of FAO Statistical Area No. 18 could then be
adjusted accordingly.160
A word of caution is warranted here, however. While the Arctic
LMEs defined by PAME have taken account of “trophic relationships,”161 this is quite different from a criterion such as “usefulness
for conservation and management of target species.”162 And, even if
the latter criterion were in fact used, the negotiations on the
CCAMLR Convention illustrate that political considerations can
override science-based criteria. Another political consideration
would nevertheless attribute great weight to the LMEs defined by
154. It is of course acknowledged that regimes for enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are
also mainly or exclusively determined by ecosystem boundaries.
155. See James N. Barnes, The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in
the Southern Ocean, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES: ISSUES IN
MARINE POLLUTION AND THE EXPLOITATION OF ANTARCTICA 239, 261-62 (Jonathan I. Charney ed., 1982) (observing that at the insistence of Argentina, the boundary was drawn further away from Argentine territory in order to exclude the Drake Passage). FAO statistical
charts were later modified accordingly. See FAO Fisheris & Agric. Dep’t, supra note 148; see
also F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 218, 292 (1982).
156. These can be found at http://www.pame.is/ecosystem-approach.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Large Marine Ecosystems of the Arctic Region and Linked Watersheds,
http://www.pame.is/ecosystem-approach (last visited Dec. 18, 2009).
160. The historical FAO statistical charts, supra note 148, indicate that this is a common practice.
161. PROGRAM FOR PROT. OF ARCTIC MARINE ENV’T, WORKING GROUP MEETING REPORT
NO: I-2006 11 (2006).
162. Erik J. Molenar, Artic Fisheries Conservation and Management: Initial Steps of
Reform of the International Legal Framework 26, available at http://doc.nprb.org/web/
nprb/afs_2009/Molenaar%20Arctic%20Fisheries%20Conservation%20and%20Management
%20final%20version%20to%20YPL.pdf (text submitted to Yearbook of Polar Law
March 2009).
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PAME. This would be the wish to pursue integrated, crosssectoral, ecosystem based, ocean governance.
By contrast, large expansions, by which the NEAFC Convention Area would comprise the entire Arctic Ocean, as suggested in
the EU Commission’s Arctic Communication,163 appear much more
problematic. This is not so much caused by the interests of the new
coastal states, namely Canada and the United States. In fact,
Canada would not really be a new coastal state as it currently already has the status of Cooperating Non-Contracting Party (NCP)
with NEAFC. In light of this status, Canada may even apply for
full membership in the future. NEAFC’s existing spatial competence in the Atlantic sector of the Arctic, as well as potential adjustments of this spatial competence, do not appear to have played
a role in Canada’s decision to apply for NCP status.164 This does
not exclude, however, that such considerations could not play a
role in the future.165 In case Canada would indeed apply for full
membership, this would, at any rate, indicate its willingness to accept the substance of the NEAFC Convention, as modified by the
2004 and 2006 amendments.166 It is less clear if the United States
would have significant problems with the substance of the
amended NEAFC Convention.
Perhaps more important, however, is whether or not Canada
and the United States have fundamental objections to NEAFC’s
practices on the establishment and allocation of the total allowable
catch (TAC) for straddling fish stocks, for the reason that these
clearly give preferential treatment to coastal states. The initiative
lies here with the coastal states, who first agree on a coastal state
TAC while taking account of the scientific advice provided by
ICES.167 However, as the ICES advice relates to the entire stock,
the coastal states effectively determine the high seas TAC as well.
163. See Arctic Region Communication, supra note 97, at 8 (observing that “[i]n principle, extending the mandate of existing management organisations such as NEAFC is preferable to creating new ones.”).
164. Email correspondence between Erik J. Molenaar and L. Ridgeway, Dir. Gen., Int’l
Policy & Integration, Fisheries & Oceans Can. (Nov. 2008) (on file with author).
165. See generally NEAFC Convention, supra note 8, art. 19 (stating that once Canada
is a member of NEAFC it can participate in decision making on proposals to adjust the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention; such decisions require a three-fourths majority).
166. See id. art. 19(4) (stating that if Canada would insist on acceding to the ‘old’ version of the NEAFC Convention, this would not attract the necessary majority pursuant to
Art. 20(4) of the NEAFC Convention).
167. E.g., Agreed Record of Conclusions of Fisheries Consultations Between Norway,
the European Community and the Faroe Islands on the Management of Mackerel in the
North-East Atlantic for 2008 [hereinafter 2008 Agreed Record], annex I, Nor.-Eur. Cmty.Faroe Is., Oct. 30, 2007, available at http://www.fisk.fo/Admin/public/DWSDownload
.aspx?File=%2FFiles%2FFiler%2FFisk%2FPDF%2F301007_Makrelsemjan_2008.pdf.
See
also North East Atlantic Fisheries Comm’n, Performance Review Panel Report 14, 17
(2006).
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The coastal states also allocate the coastal state TAC between
them, without specifying which part of each coastal state’s allocation should be caught within or beyond areas under national jurisdiction.168 NEAFC is then charged with determining and allocating
the high seas TAC.169 Even though room for maneuvering seems
limited, it should not be forgotten that there are only five Members
of NEAFC and three of these are regarded as coastal states, with
respect to all three main straddling fish stocks regulated
by NEAFC.170
While Canada and the United States would, as coastal states,
of course benefit from such preferential treatment as well, it is not
excluded that they would object to such practices in order to be
consistent with their user or non-user interests in other RFMOs
and Arrangements. Much more problematic, however, are the user
interests of states that are not coastal states with respect to the
North-East Atlantic Ocean or the Arctic Ocean: e.g., the other
states that currently have the status of NCP with NEAFC (Belize,
Cook Islands, Japan and New Zealand) and other states with large
distant water fishing fleets, such as China and South Korea. Even
though fishing opportunities in the high seas pocket of the central
Arctic Ocean are likely to be very minimal in the near future, climate change may alter the Arctic marine area, both rapidly and
fundamentally, in the medium term. Consequently, it cannot be
ruled out that fishing opportunities in the high seas of the Arctic
Ocean will be substantial in the medium and long terms. Not only
is the size of the high seas pocket enormous, but the fisheries on
the nose and tail of the Grand Banks in the Northwest Atlantic
also aptly illustrate that just a small area of the high seas may be
sufficient.
C. Adjusting the Spatial Scope of the OSPAR Convention
In case it is deemed desirable to pursue integrated, crosssectoral, ecosystem-based ocean governance in the Arctic Ocean, it
168. See 2008 Agreed Record, supra note 167, annex I, para. 1.
169. With respect to mackerel, see, e.g., NORTH EAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMM’N,
PERFORMANCE REVIEW PANEL REPORT OF THE NORTH EAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION ON MACKEREL, RECOMMENDATION I: 2008 (2008), available at
http://neafc.org/measures/current_measures/1_mackerel-08.html (stating
“[r]ecommendation by the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in accordance with
Article 5 of the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries at its Annual Meeting in November 2007 to adopt conservation and management
measures for mackerel in the NEAFC Convention Area in 2008.”).
170. These are blue whiting, herring and mackerel. The Russian Federation is not regarded as a coastal state for blue whiting and mackerel and Iceland is not regarded as a
coastal state for mackerel.
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is logical to examine the opportunities and limitations of adjusting
the spatial scope of the OSPAR Convention for the reason that the
Convention already covers the Atlantic sector of the Arctic Ocean.
It is interesting to note that whereas the Arctic Communication
refers explicitly to the option of adjusting the spatial scope of the
NEAFC Convention, this option is not raised with regard to the
OSPAR Convention. Quite surprisingly, the Arctic Communication, in fact, does not explicitly refer to the OSPAR Convention or
the OSPAR Commission at all.
There are currently sixteen parties to the OSPAR Convention:
two states that are located upstream on watercourses reaching the
OSPAR Maritime Area (Luxemburg and Switzerland); the EC; and
all coastal states bordering the North-East Atlantic, except the
Russian Federation. The spatial adjustment of the OSPAR Convention is specifically mentioned in Article 27(2), which stipulates:
The Contracting Parties may unanimously invite
States or regional economic integration organisations
not referred to in Article 25 to accede to the Convention. In the case of such an accession, the definition of
the maritime area shall, if necessary, be amended by
a decision of the Commission adopted by unanimous
vote of the Contracting Parties. Any such amendment
shall enter into force after unanimous approval of all
the Contracting Parties on the thirtieth day after the
r e c e i p t o f t h e l a s t n o t i f i c a t i o n b y t h e Depositary Government.171
The states envisaged by this provision can, in view of the list in
Article 25, be either coastal states whose maritime zones are adjacent or near to the OSPAR Maritime Area or states that have no
such maritime zones (e.g. states whose vessels or nationals are engaged in activities in the OSPAR Maritime Area). While it is not
clear which states of the former category the negotiators had in
mind when negotiating this provision, Canada and the United
States would seem to be among them. The Russian Federation
does not need an invitation to accede, as Article 27(1) gives it, as a
coastal state to the OSPAR Maritime Area, a right to do so. If desired, an extension of the OSPAR Maritime Area would, in such a
case, probably have to follow the amendment procedure laid down
in Article 15.
As pointed out earlier, the northern boundaries of the OSPAR
171. OSPAR Convention, supra note 9, art. 27(2).
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Convention are identical to those of its predecessors, the Oslo Convention and the Paris Convention, which were in their turn modeled exactly on those of the 1959 predecessor to the NEAFC Convention. It was also noted that the rationale for these northern
boundaries is not evident.
Similar to the discussion in section III, a distinction can be
made between relatively small adjustments and a large adjustment by which the entire Arctic Ocean would be comprised within
the OSPAR Maritime Area. Small adjustments, expansions as well
as contractions, may for instance be warranted due to changes in
the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention or the creation of an
Arctic marine environmental protection regime immediately adjacent to the OSPAR Maritime Area. In view of the discussion above,
it is clear that nothing in the OSPAR Convention would preclude
such spatial adjustments, as such.
Similarly, nothing in the OSPAR Convention would preclude a
large adjustment by which the entire Arctic Ocean would be comprised within the OSPAR Maritime Area, as such. This may, for
instance, be warranted if a similar adjustment is made in the spatial scope of the NEAFC Convention and a 100% overlap is desirable. This option would have the considerable advantage of subjecting the entire Arctic Ocean to the OSPAR Commission’s competence on cross-sectoral issues and sectoral activities that are not
yet subject to the competence of other regional and global bodies. It
should also be remembered, however, that the shortcomings of the
OSPAR Convention and the OSPAR Commission would be transposed to the Arctic Ocean as well.
More important seem to be the preparedness of Canada, the
Russian Federation and the United States to become bound to the
OSPAR Convention and the many legally binding decisions, nonlegally binding recommendations and other agreements adopted by
the OSPAR Commission. Would they be prepared to accept this
“acquis” without significant amendments? Perhaps this is one of
the main reasons why the Russian Federation is currently not a
party to the OSPAR Convention, even though it is a coastal state
to the OSPAR Maritime Area. It is also noteworthy that neither
the Russian Federation nor the Soviet Union were parties to the
Oslo and Paris Conventions.
D. Implementing Agreement under the LOS Convention
It has been suggested that in case a legally binding instrument
for the marine Arctic is pursued, one option would be to link it directly to the LOS Convention by means of an Implementing
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Agreement, under the LOS Convention.172 It must be acknowledged that no rule of international law, including the LOS Convention, would preclude this per se. Even though the LOS Convention
contains various amendment procedures,173 at two earlier instances the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) expressed
the international community’s preference for an Implementing
Agreement instead. These are the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining
Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement. Pragmatic and strategic considerations may therefore be of overriding importance.
This is particularly evident in the case of the Part XI Deep-Sea
Mining Agreement, which clearly modifies Part XI of the LOS
Convention. Thus, while there is no precedent for an Implementing
Agreement with a regional scope,174 no rule of international law,
including the LOS Convention, would in principle prevent the international community from pursuing such an option if the required majority so desires.
This notwithstanding, there are various reasons why an Implementing Agreement under the LOS Convention is not a realistic
option. Most importantly, the direct link with the LOS Convention
would imply that its negotiation process would fall under the UNGA. Not only would the UNGA decide on the overall objective,
scope, and main elements of an Implementing Agreement but it
would also determine, implicitly or explicitly, the rules of procedure for its negotiation. As the LOS Convention is a global instrument and the UNGA a global body, it would be difficult to conceive
of a negotiation process open to a select group of states instead of
all members of the United Nations (UN). However, it is almost unthinkable that the five Arctic Ocean coastal states would support
and participate in a negotiation process where they could potentially be confronted by 180-odd states with opposing views
172. This has, for instance, been suggested by the Executive Director of the European
Environment Agency (EEA). See Jaqueline McGlade, Executive Dir., Eur. Env’t Agency, The
Arctic Environment - Why Europe Should Care, Speech Delivered at the Arctic Frontiers
Conference, Tromsø (Jan. 23, 2007), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/pressroom/
speeches/23-01-2007. The actual wording used in this speech is “Polar Ocean protocol.” Id.
This wording is confusing because it can be interpreted as applying to both the Arctic Ocean
and the Southern Ocean. Note that the words “based on UNCLOS” on page 10 of the European Commission’s Arctic Communication, supra note 97, indicate that the option of an
Implementation Agreement under the LOS Convention is no longer being pursued.
173. See LOS Convention, supra note 10, arts. 312-316.
174. None of the existing regional marine environmental protection regimes are
formally linked to the LOS Convention. While the LOS Convention contains qualified
obligations on regional cooperation, it does not provide guidance on the outcome of such
cooperation. Likewise, the constituent instruments of RFMOs and Arrangements are not(?)
formally linked to the LOS Convention or the Fish Stocks Agreement, even though the Fish
Stocks Agreement provides considerable guidance as regards the functions and operation of
RFMOs and Arrangements and the substance of their constituent instruments.
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and interests.
Such lack of support by the Arctic Ocean coastal states would
be obvious if the envisaged Implementing Agreement would apply
to the entire Arctic Ocean, including areas under their national
jurisdiction. However, even if the instrument would exclusively
apply to areas beyond national jurisdiction (high seas and the
Area), it is easy to understand that the Arctic Ocean coastal states
would fear that the UNGA would not take adequate account of
their sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction as coastal
states when determining substantive and procedural aspects of the
negotiation process. States with a claim or the basis for a claim to
the Antarctic continent had, to some extent, similar concerns when
they were confronted by the Malaysian-led initiative to bring the
governance of Antarctica under the scope of the UN.175 In light of
these considerations, it is not surprising that there is no precedent
for an Implementing Agreement to the LOS Convention with a
regional scope.
Such an instrument might also serve a purpose that is essentially similar to the guidance provided by the Fish Stocks Agreement on the functions and operation of RFMOs and Arrangements
and the substance of their constituent instruments. This global
Implementing Agreement could then provide guidance on the substance of the regional Arctic instrument and the functions and operation of the bodies established by it.
E. Arguments For and Against a New International Legally
Binding Instrument for the Governance and Regulation of the
Arctic Ocean
Emphasizing the many benefits that one or more
binding agreements might offer, various authors and
organizations have advocated for the negotiation of a
hard law regime for the Arctic. Suggested benefits include: encouraging greater political and bureaucratic
commitments; establishing firmer institutional and financial foundations; transcending the vagaries of
changing governmental viewpoints and shifting personnel; giving ‘legal teeth’ to environmental principles
and standards; raising the public profile of regional
challenges and cooperation needs; and providing for
175. See G.A. Res. 38/77, para. 1, U.N. DOC. A/RES/38/77 (Dec. 15, 1983); Christopher
C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Indian Ocean States: The Interplay of Law, Interests, and
Geopolitics, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 41, 48-49 (1990).
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dispute resolution mechanisms.
However, various reasons have been put forward
against—or at least questioning—a treaty-based approach. Reasons given include the following considerations: difficulty in getting consensus on the need for an
agreement; lengthy and costly preparatory and negotiation processes involved; risk of legalizing lowest
common denominator standards; stifling political and
bureaucratic flexibilities; and contributing another
layer of complexity to the already fragmented array of
multilateral environmental agreements. The lack of
implementation of existing agreements relevant to the
Arctic and lack of assurance that all Arctic states will
readily accept newly negotiated obligations are
additional reasons.176
A few things are certain about the future of ocean governance
in the Arctic. The quest for effective transboundary cooperation is
not over and voices within the EU and Canada are bound to keep
the Arctic treaty debate alive.

176. Timo Koivurova & David L. VanderZwaag, The Arctic Council at 10 Years:
Retrospect and Prospects, 40 UNIV. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 121, 178-80 (2007) (footnotes
omitted).
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